high fly
02-17-2008, 01:19 PM
CondoLIES!LIES!LIES!zza Rice took offense the other day when her dishonesty was brought up by Representative Wexler.
Check this out, and keep in mind the offense she takes at her integrity being called into question.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qyKOkGjodhY
Here are some Condi quotes which illustrate her difficulty with the truth which led to her integrity being questioned in the first place:
1) [the aluminum tubes] "Are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs." --Sept. 8, 2002
[the aluminum tubes, after examination and testing] "not consistent with gas centrifuge end use..." [Plus, you've got to have something for the tubes to plug into] " we have not seen related procurement efforts." --Quotes from April 11, 2001 Energy Dept. report, "Iraq High Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement."
" no definitive intelligence that it [shipment of the aluminum tubes] is destined for a nuclear programme" ---British Sept. 24, 2001 dossier on Iraqi WMD programs.
"That was a reflection of the state of the intelligence" --John Scarlett, head of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, in testimony before a British investigation, Sept., 2003
[aluminum tubes]"would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges." --International Atomic Energy Agency report, Jan. 27, 2003
An additional "clue" (as they call it in police work) might have been the fact that the tubes were marked, "81mm rocket."
The tubes were also identical to 66,737 artillery rocket tubes called the Nasser 81, chronicled by UN inspectors in 1996. The Nasser 81 was a copy of the Italian Medusa 81mm rocket.
Additionally, the Energy Dept. tested the tubes at Oak Ridge, Tennessee and found they fell apart under the stress of a spinning centrifuge.
____________________________________
2) [the phony uranium purchase documents]"Maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery." --June, 2003
The claim of an Iraqi attempt to purchase uranium in Africa was in Bush's State of the Union speech, Jan. 28, 2003. By then, every major rationale for war with Iraq had been shot down or called into serious question, and the administration was desperate for something to support the claim of a revived nuke program.
At the time of her speech, those in her "circle" who had been told that the documents were forgeries were:
ROBERT JOSEPH, assistant to the president in charge of nonproliferation at the National Security Council, who was told by Alan Foley, Director of CIA Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center. Foley saw a draft of Bush's state of the union speech and got ahold of Joseph.
MICHAEL GERSON, chief speechwriter for President Bush who had been told in a CIA memo dated Oct. 5, 2001, that the allegation was bogus and to leave it out of a Bush speech Oct, 7, 2002, which they did.
STEPHEN HADLEY, Rice's deputy national security advisor, and unnamed others, who also recieved the Oct. 5 memo, as well as a memo )ct. 6, 2001 from DCI George Tenet, saying the charge was bogus, citing "weakness in the evidence" and saying the alleged attemped purchase "was not particularly significant." Hadley also had been told by Tenet in a phone call not to include the allegation.
STAFF OF VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY, Who tasked Joseph C. Wilson to go to Niger and investigate the deal described in the phony documents. Wilson's report that there was no such deal went to those who dispatched him.
CONDOLEEZZA RICE, yes, friends, one would think that she would be a member of her own "circle," right? She was a recipient of the Oct. 5, 2001 memo.
_______________________________________
3)"I don't think anybody could have predicted that these same people [9/11 hijackers]... would try to use a hijacked airplane as a missile." --May 2002
This was "thought" of by many people, most significantly those who wrote 12 intelligence reports specifically addressing this threat, described in the House-Senate Joint Inquiry report and which were available to Rice.
Too long for me to type them all out here, they can be found on pages 443-445 of "The 9/11 Investigations" edited by Steven Strasser, published by PublicAffairs. It contains lengthy excerpts from the House-Senate report, staff reports of the 9/11 Commission, and reprints the testimony of people before the commission like Condoleezza Rice and Richard Clarke.
As National security advisor, she could have had these reports by just asking, before 9/11, when the administration was being swamped with reports of an impending "spectacular" attack. Had she asked, one report she would have received on terrorism would have been the 1997 National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat. In it was the threat of the use of a hijacked plane as a missile, among other things.
That summer, President Bush had traveled to Genoa to a summit of the G8.
Fearing what Rice said no one "could have predicted," the airspace over Genoa was cleared and the U.S. deployed anti-aircraft weaponry around the place. U.S. Navy ships were redeployed to support the mission of preventing a hijacked aircraft from crashing into the buiding holding the summit.
The idea also occurred to the FBI Minneapolis Field Office when it requested an investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui. The agent filing the request said, "This is the kind of guy who could fly a plane into the World Trade Center."
In the request, the FBI agent requested that the Secret Service be notified of just such a threat to the White House.
"A classified September 1998 threat report warned that in bin Laden's next strike, his operatives might fly an explosives-laden airplane into an American airport and blow it up. Another report that fall, unavailable to the public, highlighted a plot involving aircraft in New York and Washington. In a third case, in November, Turkish authorities broke up a plan by an Islamic extremist group to fly a plane loaded with explosives into the tomb of modern Turkey's founder, Ataturk, during a ceremony marking the anniversary of his death. Some
Check this out, and keep in mind the offense she takes at her integrity being called into question.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qyKOkGjodhY
Here are some Condi quotes which illustrate her difficulty with the truth which led to her integrity being questioned in the first place:
1) [the aluminum tubes] "Are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs." --Sept. 8, 2002
[the aluminum tubes, after examination and testing] "not consistent with gas centrifuge end use..." [Plus, you've got to have something for the tubes to plug into] " we have not seen related procurement efforts." --Quotes from April 11, 2001 Energy Dept. report, "Iraq High Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement."
" no definitive intelligence that it [shipment of the aluminum tubes] is destined for a nuclear programme" ---British Sept. 24, 2001 dossier on Iraqi WMD programs.
"That was a reflection of the state of the intelligence" --John Scarlett, head of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, in testimony before a British investigation, Sept., 2003
[aluminum tubes]"would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges." --International Atomic Energy Agency report, Jan. 27, 2003
An additional "clue" (as they call it in police work) might have been the fact that the tubes were marked, "81mm rocket."
The tubes were also identical to 66,737 artillery rocket tubes called the Nasser 81, chronicled by UN inspectors in 1996. The Nasser 81 was a copy of the Italian Medusa 81mm rocket.
Additionally, the Energy Dept. tested the tubes at Oak Ridge, Tennessee and found they fell apart under the stress of a spinning centrifuge.
____________________________________
2) [the phony uranium purchase documents]"Maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery." --June, 2003
The claim of an Iraqi attempt to purchase uranium in Africa was in Bush's State of the Union speech, Jan. 28, 2003. By then, every major rationale for war with Iraq had been shot down or called into serious question, and the administration was desperate for something to support the claim of a revived nuke program.
At the time of her speech, those in her "circle" who had been told that the documents were forgeries were:
ROBERT JOSEPH, assistant to the president in charge of nonproliferation at the National Security Council, who was told by Alan Foley, Director of CIA Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center. Foley saw a draft of Bush's state of the union speech and got ahold of Joseph.
MICHAEL GERSON, chief speechwriter for President Bush who had been told in a CIA memo dated Oct. 5, 2001, that the allegation was bogus and to leave it out of a Bush speech Oct, 7, 2002, which they did.
STEPHEN HADLEY, Rice's deputy national security advisor, and unnamed others, who also recieved the Oct. 5 memo, as well as a memo )ct. 6, 2001 from DCI George Tenet, saying the charge was bogus, citing "weakness in the evidence" and saying the alleged attemped purchase "was not particularly significant." Hadley also had been told by Tenet in a phone call not to include the allegation.
STAFF OF VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY, Who tasked Joseph C. Wilson to go to Niger and investigate the deal described in the phony documents. Wilson's report that there was no such deal went to those who dispatched him.
CONDOLEEZZA RICE, yes, friends, one would think that she would be a member of her own "circle," right? She was a recipient of the Oct. 5, 2001 memo.
_______________________________________
3)"I don't think anybody could have predicted that these same people [9/11 hijackers]... would try to use a hijacked airplane as a missile." --May 2002
This was "thought" of by many people, most significantly those who wrote 12 intelligence reports specifically addressing this threat, described in the House-Senate Joint Inquiry report and which were available to Rice.
Too long for me to type them all out here, they can be found on pages 443-445 of "The 9/11 Investigations" edited by Steven Strasser, published by PublicAffairs. It contains lengthy excerpts from the House-Senate report, staff reports of the 9/11 Commission, and reprints the testimony of people before the commission like Condoleezza Rice and Richard Clarke.
As National security advisor, she could have had these reports by just asking, before 9/11, when the administration was being swamped with reports of an impending "spectacular" attack. Had she asked, one report she would have received on terrorism would have been the 1997 National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat. In it was the threat of the use of a hijacked plane as a missile, among other things.
That summer, President Bush had traveled to Genoa to a summit of the G8.
Fearing what Rice said no one "could have predicted," the airspace over Genoa was cleared and the U.S. deployed anti-aircraft weaponry around the place. U.S. Navy ships were redeployed to support the mission of preventing a hijacked aircraft from crashing into the buiding holding the summit.
The idea also occurred to the FBI Minneapolis Field Office when it requested an investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui. The agent filing the request said, "This is the kind of guy who could fly a plane into the World Trade Center."
In the request, the FBI agent requested that the Secret Service be notified of just such a threat to the White House.
"A classified September 1998 threat report warned that in bin Laden's next strike, his operatives might fly an explosives-laden airplane into an American airport and blow it up. Another report that fall, unavailable to the public, highlighted a plot involving aircraft in New York and Washington. In a third case, in November, Turkish authorities broke up a plan by an Islamic extremist group to fly a plane loaded with explosives into the tomb of modern Turkey's founder, Ataturk, during a ceremony marking the anniversary of his death. Some